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1. Introduction
Hours worked per adult in the United States were more than 20 percent
below normal throughout the 1930s. Many economists agree that this large
and persistent employment decline is the dening feature of the Great De-
pression, and characterize this as a chronic excess supply of labor reecting
a persistent and large labor market failure. Cole and Ohanian [1] develop a
theory of labor market failure for the post-1933 depression, based on Pres-
ident Roosevelt's New Deal labor-industrial policies. These policies raised
real wages substantially above market-clearing levels which in turn kept em-
ployment and output low. But there is no theory of labor market failure
prior to the New Deal. This paper develops such a theory, and quanties its
contribution to the earlier stages of the Great Depression.
The theory is based on President Hoover's industrial labor program, in
conjunction with the growing power of unions. In November 1929, Hoover
met with the leaders of the major industrial rms and presented his plan to
deal with a possible recession. He told them that at a minimum, they should
not cut wages, and preferably would raise wages. He also advised them to
share work among employees. In return for maintaining or raising wages and
for work-sharing, Hoover told industry that he would keep union demands
2at bay. Following his conference with industry, Hoover secured organized
labor's agreement to withdraw demands for higher wages and not to strike.
The largest manufacturers very publicly advertised their compliance with
Hoover's wage program by either raising nominal wages or keeping nominal
wages xed at their 1929 levels, and by signicantly spreading work among
employees. There was very little new union organization or strikes during
this period.
By late 1931, real manufacturing average hourly earnings had increased
more than 10 percent as a consequence of the Hoover program and deation.
By September 1931, manufacturing hours worked had declined more than 40
percent, and the average workweek in manufacturing had declined by about
20 percent.
To evaluate the quantitative impact of Hoover's program, I calculate the
equilibrium of a model economy with rms paying the observed real wage
in the industrial sector and following the observed workweek. I nd that
Hoover's program substantially depressed the economy, reducing aggregate
output and hours worked by about 20 percent. But why would rms be
willing to follow the Hoover program? Because in return for paying high
wages, Hoover oered protection from unions at a time when rms deeply
feared unionization and when court decisions and unionization policy - in-
cluding policies advanced by, and signed into law by Hoover - substantially
3increased the likelihood of organization and raised union bargaining power.
To assess this union protection hypothesis, I extend the model to include the
possibility of union organization that is similar to Cole and Ohanian [1], but
diers in that it is tailored to capture the central feature of unions at that
time, which was the ability to strike and extract rents from capital. I use
the model to quantify the benets of union protection, and nd that it was
indeed plausible that rms would follow Hoover's program.
This research complements a large body of work on the Depression, in-
cluding Friedman and Schwartz [2], who tie the Great Depression to a decline
in nominal spending and deation. This long-standing view, however, re-
quires a theory, but as Lucas (2007) notes, the development of such a theory
remains a challenge, precisely because it requires rationalizing such a large
and persistent monetary nonneutrality (see Parker [3]). This paper provides
such a theory through Hoover's industrial labor program, which raised real
wages in conjunction with deation.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents data, with a
focus on comparing the industrial sector, which was distorted by Hoover, to
the agricultural sector, which was not impacted by Hoover's program. Sec-
tion 3 summarizes Hoover's views on wages, unions, and industrial carteliza-
tion. Section 4 describes Hoover's labor program and how industry followed
it. Section 5 describes the incentives for rms to follow Hoover. Section 6
4presents the benchmark model, and the impact of Hoover's program on the
Depression. Section 7 extends the model to include a union that can hold-up
capital to quantify the benets for rms to follow Hoover. Section 8 discusses
the paper in relation to the broader literature, and discusses the contribution
of the paper as developing a monetary theory of the Depression. Section 9
concludes.
2. The Depression under Hoover: Low Employment and High Wages
This section presents data that highlight the severity of the industrial
contraction, the industrial labor market failure, in which low manufacturing
employment coincided with high wages, and also present data that contrast
the industrial sector's signicant decline with the much milder decline in the
agricultural sector, which experienced no labor market failure. I focus the
analysis from late 1929 to late 1931, the period in which Hoover has the most
inuence on industry.
I begin by presenting data on industrial economic activity. Figure 1 show
monthly manufacturing hours worked and manufacturing output (source:
NBER macro history database). At this time, manufacturing accounted
for about 28 percent of employment. These data show that the industrial
depression begins abruptly and severely in late 1929. Specically, industrial
hours and output rise until Fall, 1929, but decline rapidly afterwards. Hours
5and output fall 20 percent by June, 1930, and by roughly 40 percent by Fall,
1931. Figure 2 decomposes manufacturing hours into changes in employment
and changes in the length of the workweek, as both decline signicantly.
Employment declines by about 30 percent over this interval and the workweek
declines by about 20 percent.
Note that these data paint a very dierent picture from the standard
view that the Great Depression was initially a "garden variety recession"
(see Eichengreen and Bordo [4]). Instead these data show that the industrial
Depression was immediately severe and deep. In contrast, agriculture, which
accounted for about the same share of employment as manufacturing in 1929,
does not experience a drop in hours or real output. In fact, hours worked in
agriculture actually rise slightly between 1929 and 1931, increasing by about
1.5 percent. Real agricultural output rises by about 4 percent over this time
period (Kendrick [5], page 363-365).
These data show a remarkable dierence in economic performance across
these two major sectors, and raise the question of why the Depression af-
fected these two sectors so dierently. Real wage data suggest that a key
source for these dierences lies in dierences in the operation of their respec-
tive labor markets. The industrial depression coincides with a signicant
industrial labor market distortion, as real manufacturing wages rose during
the Depression. Figure 3 shows the nominal manufacturing wage, and the
6real manufacturing wage.1 Real wages rise modestly at the start of the De-
pression, and continue to rise as the Depression deepens. The gure shows
that for much of this period, higher real wages are the consequence of roughly
constant nominal wages and deation. The industrial labor market distor-
tion is suggested by the fact that higher real wages coincide with substantial
employment loss. In sharp contrast, real wages fall considerably in agricul-
ture. The real agricultural wage, which is the daily farm wage rate relative
to the CPI, declines by about 25 percent between 1929 and 1931. (United
States Department of Agriculture, Statistical Bulletin Number 822, 1991)).2
To provide further evidence of a large industrial labor market distortion,
I present data that indicates that households were signicantly constrained
in selling labor services in the industrial labor market, and I also summarize
data that indicates the supply price of labor was well below the industrial
wage. To show that households were constrained in selling labor services,
I rst note that in the absence of a labor market distortion, households
should have equated the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure to the real manufacturing wage. However, this implication is
strongly at variance with the data. Using preferences that are logarithmic
1I use average hourly earnings (Hanes, 1996) for the nominal wage, and construct the
real wage using the consumer price index.
2Agricultural hours and wages are available only at the annual frequency.
7between consumption and leisure, and using data on consumption, hours
worked, and the manufacturing real wage, I nd that the manufacturing wage
is about 30 percent higher than the marginal rate of substitution in 1931,
which is consistent with the view that the manufacturing wage was well above
its market-clearing level, and that households were rationed in selling their
labor services in industrial labor markets. Mulligan [6], and Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan [7], also report a large deviation in this marginal rate of
substitution condition.
Data on the supply price of labor also indicate a large labor market dis-
tortion that prevented this market clearing. Simon [8] presents data on the
supply price of labor from "help oered" ads, in which individuals placed
ads in newspapers looking for work with a desired wage, and with a sum-
mary of their work characteristics. Simon shows that the supply price of
labor is as much as 40% below the wage paid, adjusting for selection and
quality. In contrast, the supply price of labor in help oered ads, and the
actual wage, were very similar just before the Depression, typically within a
couple of percentage points of each other. Simon's evidence indicates that
the gap between the actual wage and the market clearing wage was not only
large, but that it did not respond to what clearly should have been very
strong competitive forces that should have reduced the wage and increased
employment. These data are also consistent with a substantial labor market
8distortion which kept the industrial wage far above its market-clearing level.
This analysis suggests that the key to understanding the Depression is
understanding and quantifying this labor market distortion. The next section
proposes a theory for this distortion based on Herbert Hoover's industrial
labor market program which, in conjunction with deation, fostered higher
real wages in the industrial sector, and which prevented those wages from
declining, even in the face of strong countervailing economic forces.
3. Hoover as a New Dealer
While Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a market-oriented President,
some of his labor and industrial policies were thematically similar to Roo-
sevelt's New Deal policies. Like Roosevelt, Hoover created policies that al-
lowed industry to cooperate in order to stem what he perceived to be the
depressing eects of "cutthroat competition". And like Roosevelt, Hoover
believed high wages were the key to prosperity. Hoover's policies began in
the 1920s as Commerce Secretary. It is well documented that Hoover helped
create industry trade associations for the purpose of rm cooperation, includ-
ing sharing data on cost, output, and prices, and promoting standardization
of products. The central goal of trade associations was to prevent "destruc-
tive competition", as Hoover, like Roosevelt argued that limiting competition
would lead to superior economic outcomes.
9The view that limiting competition was essential for economic prosperity
was inuential at this time, and was the result of the perceived success of
World War I economic planning in which government, rather than markets,
allocated production, and de facto limited competition by assigning partic-
ular goods to be produced to particular producers (See Hawley [9], [10],
Himmelberg [11], and Rothbard [12] for extensive discussions of Hoover's de-
velopment of trade associations and his views about competition). There are
many statements from Hoover on the benets of cooperative trade associa-
tions and limiting competition:
"...In 1927 as Secretary of Commerce, I wrote the foreword to a bulletin on
"Trade Association Activities" in which I said: 'the national interest requires
a certain degree of cooperation between individuals in order that we may re-
duce and eliminate industrial waste, lay the foundation for constant decrease
in production and distribution costs, and thereby obtain the fundamental in-
crease in wages and standards of living. Trade Associations, like many other
good things, may be abused, but the investigation of the Department of Com-
merce shows that such abuses have become rare exceptions. Within the last
few years trade associations have rapidly developed into legitimate and con-
structive elds of the utmost public interest and have marked a fundamental
step in the gradual evolution of our whole economic life.' No facts have come
to my attention which would cause me to change the opinions expressed at
10that time, rather every development of industry renders trade associations
more essential to sound development of our economic system". (Hoover din-
ner speech presented at the convention of the American Trade Association
Executives, source: htp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22633)
In his Memoirs (1952), Hoover stated:
...the great area of indirect economic wrong and unethical practices that
spring up under the pressures of competition...the great eld of economic
waster through destructive competition, through strikes, , through failure of
our dierent industries to synchronize...I then described the possibilities of
using the multitude of associational activities ...to bring these ideas to reality,
we enlisted the dierent trade associations in creation of codes of business
practice and ethics that eliminate abuses." (Hoover [13])
There is considerable evidence that the trade associations facilitated the
collusion that characterized large industry in the 1920s. Kovacic and Shapiro
[14] discuss that trade associations were the central cooperative agency for in-
dustry at this time, that the Executive Branch discouraged aggressive prose-
cution by Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, and that
the Courts also were inuenced by the limited competition view: "Supreme
Court decisions in this era (1916-1936) aecting collusion and cooperation
between rms reected tolerant treatment...By the early 1930s, in the depths
of the depression, even the court's stand against naked horizontal output re-
11strictions wavered. In Appalachian Coals Inc. vs. United States, the Court
refused to condemn an output restriction scheme embodied in a joint market-
ing agreement proposed by coal producers... the Court appeared to have lost
faith in free market competition and welcomed experiments with sector-wide
private ordering." Epstein [15] reports that industrial prots, particularly
for large rms, were high during the 1920s, which is consistent with the fact
that capital's share of income in manufacturing rose substantially during this
period.
Hoover was also a strong supporter of unions and high wages. Hoover
emphasized in his Memoirs that he was delighted with the signicant growth
of union wages, which rose about 40 percent in the 1920s, compared to only
about a 6 percent increase for non-union wages (Bureau of the Census, 1976).
In his Memoirs, Hoover presented a table of U.S. union wages in the U.S. in
the 1920s, contrasted with real wages from the U.K., which had not advanced,
and remarked:
"We could as a nation show one of the most astonishing transformations
in economic history, the epitome of which lies in the following table, com-
piled from the department of labor statistics...These gures demonstrate one
positive thing - the rapid increase of real (union) wages. A comparison with
British indexes gives evidence that these results are peculiar to the United
States.", pp 77-78.
12According to Hoover, high real wages were necessary to keep demand,
and in turn output, high:
" not so many years ago, the employer considered it was in his interest to
use the opportunities of unemployment and immigration to lower wages... the
lowest wages and longest hours were then conceived as the means to obtain
highest prots. But we are a long way on the road to new conceptions. The
very essence of great production is high wages...because it depends upon
a widening range of consumption only to be obtained from the purchasing
power of high real wages...." (p. 108, Hoover [13]).
Hoover was central in advancing unionization. He promoted and signed
landmark unionization legislation, including the Davis-Bacon Act in 1931 and
the Norris-Laguardia Act in 1932, both of which raised wages and facilitated
unionization. The Davis-Bacon Act requires that prevailing (union) wages
be paid on public works projects, and the Norris-Lauguardia Act prohibited
courts from issuing injunctions against union strikes, picketing, or boycotts
and also prohibited "yellow dog" contracts, which allowed rms to require
that workers sign a contract indicating that they will be red if they join a
union. After the National Labor Relations Act, the Norris-Laguardia Act is
considered by many as the second most signicant unionization legislation in
the United States.
Hoover also supported unions by intervening in industrial-labor relations
13related to working conditions and the length of the workweek. The most
striking case of this was in the steel industry. Following unsuccessful attempts
by the union to reduce the workweek, Hoover, as Harding's Secretary of
Commerce, convinced Harding to pressure the steel industry to reduce the
workday from 12 hours to 8 hours. "I instituted an investigation by the
Department of Commerce into the 12 hour day. It was barbaric. I opened
the battle by inducing President Harding to call a dinner conference of steel
manufactures at the White House on May 18, 1922. The manufacturers, such
as Charles Schwab and Judge Elbert H. Gary (Gary was Chairman of US
Steel, which had defeated the union during a series of violent strikes in 1919),
resented my statement which asserted that it (12 hour day) was unsocial and
uneconomic. I then startled the press with the information that the President
was trying persuade the steel industry to adopt the 8 hour shift...at once a
great public discussion ensued..."
The industry strongly resisted the change but ultimately accepted it due
to continued pressure from Hoover and Harding. "When I became Secretary
of Commerce, the working hours of nearly 75 percent of industry were 54 or
more per week. When I left the White House only 4.6 percent were working
60 hours or more."
Hoover's promotion of industrial cooperation to limit competition and
his strong support of high wages and unions was similar to Roosevelt's New
14Deal. I next describe Hoover's 1929 program for raising real wages and
redistributing income from capital to labor.
4. Hoover's Labor Program
In November, 1929, Hoover met with the leaders of the major industrial
rms in manufacturing, utilities, and transportation at the White House.
Hoover presented his program for raising wages and work-sharing to avoid
rm-labor conict that he anticipated would arise. Hoover informed industry
that they were to bear the cost of a recession by securing from them an
agreement to maintain or raise nominal wage rates, and to engage in work-
sharing. In return, he secured an agreement from labor to not strike and
to not demand further wage increases. This program is clearly consistent
with Hoover's preferences for fostering high real wages, supporting unions,
and reducing the workweek. The meeting is described in Hoover's Memoirs
and by his Secretary of Commerce Thomas Lamont (1930). President Hoover
asked industry to maintain or increase current wages, as this would help keep
the industrial peace:
"...to maintain social order and industrial peace...a fundamental view (is)
that wages should be maintained for the present...that the available work
should be spread by shortening the work week...the industrial representa-
tives expressed major agreement...the same afternoon I conferred with the
15outstanding labor leaders and secured their adherence to the program...this
required the patriotic withdrawal of some wage demands..." (Hoover [13], pp
43-44). Lamont noted "One of the rst things which they (business leaders)
did was to agree in principle to maintain the level of wages to perpetuate
industrial peace".3
Hoover adopted this program not only because he believed it would reduce
conict between capital and labor, but also because it advanced his goal
of raising real wages. Hoover was particularly concerned that non-union
real wages rose much less than prots in the previous decade. Specically,
when industry broached the topic of reducing nominal wages in early 1931,
with industrial output dropping by more than 30 percent, Hoover rejected
the request, and gave no indication that wages should come down in the
future: "Wages during Prosperity went no where near so high, comparatively,
as commodity prices, business prots and dividends; therefore they should
not come down with the general decline." (Time, April 13, 31). Similarly,
The White House rejected wage cutting requests in the Fall of 1931, and
The Department of Commerce warned that wage cutting would result in
labor unrest and "Hell to pay all over the country", Time, October 5, 1931).
3 Rothbard [12] reports that industry requested additional "government-industry co-
operation" in return for agreeing to Hoover's wage program, though I have been unable
to nd other discussions of this.
16Hoover's program was ultimately aimed at systematically raising real wages
- particularly non-union wages - to reverse more than a decade of what he
perceived to be the disproportionate growth of capital income relative to
labor income.
4.1. Industry and Labor Followed Hoover's Program
Following their November 1929 meeting with Hoover, major industrial
rms either kept nominal wages xed, or raised wages, and spread work
considerably. The pattern of xed/rising nominal wages during a period of
deation and economic downturn diers remarkably from previous episodes.
To highlight this dierence, I compare wages under Hoover to those during
the previous episode of signicant deation (1920-22), when the CPI declined
by about 20 percent. Ozanne [16] describes that International Harvester,
facing no threat of unionization in the early 1920s, cut wages by 20 percent
in April 1921 and an additional 12.5 percent in November 1921 for a total
wage reduction of about 30 percent. Aggregate data also indicate signicant
wage cutting in the early 1920s. Nominal earnings of full time manufacturing
workers fell about 19 percent between 1920 and 1922. (Bureau of the Census,
1976). These large nominal industrial wage cuts from 1921-22 stand in sharp
17contrast to the relative xity of nominal wages under Hoover.4.
Firms also followed Hoover's request for work-sharing, as the average
workweek in manufacturing had declined by about 20 percent by September,
1931, compared with about a 30 percent decline in employment. In contrast,
the workweek changed very little during uctuations prior to Hoover, with
about 80 percent of the cyclical change in hours worked being accounted
for by changes in employment. For example, manufacturing employment
declined about 25 percent during the 1921-22 recession, but the workweek
declined only about 3 percent.
There is considerable evidence that indicates that Hoover was responsible
for nominal wage xity. Many large rms publicly advertised their compli-
ance with Hoover during the rst two years of the Depression, and Hoover
indicated that he was pleased with the wage policies of the major manufac-
turers and large rms: "Wage agreement held up fairly well, and most of the
non-union employers complied" (Hoover [17], p. 45).
Labor leaders attributed high wages to Hoover's program: "On October
6, 1930, William Green, president of the AFL said "the President suggested
4The fact that the aggregate decline is smaller than that of the rm level data probably
reects the fact that the aggregate data are annual averages, that the aggregate data are
not adjusted for any compositional changes, and that the aggregate data also includes
some union wages, which did not fall as much.
18that peace be preserved in industry and that wages be maintained. The great
inuence which he exercised upon that occasion served to maintain wage
standards...we appreciate the value of the service the President rendered to
the wage earners of the country" (Hoover [17], p. 46). Hoover also noted:
"In the 1931 convention of the American Federation of Labor, the executive
council in its report again expressed appreciation of my eorts and of the
substantial success. The AFL report noted "in the full year of 1930 there
were only seven rms per hundred rms had cut wages." (page 46).
University of Chicago economist Jacob Viner also attributed high wages
to Hoover. "The Hoover Administration became apostles of doctrine that
high wages are an essential of prosperity...Hoover pledged industry not to cut
wages, and for long time large-scale industry adhered to pledge", (O'Brien
[18]). This view was echoed by Commerce Secretary Andrew Mellon, who
noted "there has been a concerted and determined eort on the part of
both government and business...to prevent any reduction in wages." Time
Magazine noted "The United Press International interviewed business leaders
who attended the 1929 White House conferences, discovered an agreement
among them that Industry, by & large, had lived up to its wage pledge.
Pierre Samuel Du Pont (I. E. du Pont de Nemours & Co.), Walter Sherman
Giord (American Telephone & Telegraph). Jesse Isidor Straus (R. H. Macy
& Co.) declared their companies had not reduced their wage scales since
191929. Walter Clark Teagle said his Standard Oil of New Jersey had found it
necessary to cut workers' weekly earnings by part-time employment but that
the base pay rate had been maintained." ("Next: Wages?", 4/13/31, Time,
pp 12-13). Most of the major manufacturing rms that publicly advertised
and veried their compliance with Hoover were not unionized at the time,
including Bethlehem Steel, Dupont, Ford, GM, Goodyear, and U.S. Steel.
This evidence suggests Hoover's independent inuence on wage setting among
large-scale industry.
Not surprisingly, the impact of high wages on protability caused consid-
erable concern among industrial leaders, who in January 1931 argued that
"wage scales should be adjusted to price reduction...It is not true that high
wages make prosperity. Instead, prosperity makes high wages." (New York
Times, January, 1931, in Executive Opinion, Kroos [19]). Indiana's Repub-
lican Congressman William Robert Wood, chairman of the House Appropri-
ations Committee, noted in 1931 that "Either wages should come down or
commodity prices should go up. The wage level is far above the selling level."
("Next: Wages?", 4/13/31, Time, pp 12-13). Industrial wages clearly were
much higher than their market clearing level, and the evidence shows that
Hoover's program was responsible for the nominal industrial wage oor, and
for the substantially shorter workweek.
In return for industry following Hoover's program, labor largely kept their
20pledge to Hoover to not strike, as man-days lost to work stoppages was at
its all time low in 1930 (U.S. Bureau of Census, [20]). Moreover, there was
little labor organization during this period. Freeman reports that union
membership as a fraction of non-agricultural employment fell between 1929
and 1931.
Major producers followed this program until late 1931. At this time,
Hoover informed industry that he would not support the "Swope program",
which explicitly provided for cartels, and which was a de facto blueprint for
the National Industrial Recovery Act. Following this, major manufacturers,
including U.S. Steel and G.M instituted their rst nominal wage cuts.
5. The Incentive to Follow Hoover's Program
The benet Hoover oered to rms for following his policy was implicit
protection from unions. This section provides evidence that the benet of
protection from unions was potentially large. To do this, I rst discuss the
signicant impact that unions had on wages at this time, I then discuss
how rms prior to Hoover could eectively prevent unionization, and I then
discuss how labor policies and court decisions changed substantially, which
permanently reduced rms' ability to prevent organization. and which raised
the probability and cost of unionization.
215.1. Fear of Unions: High Union Wage Premia
It is widely agreed by labor historians that industry deeply feared unions
at this time, reecting union's ability to violently strike and extract high
wages. Firms viewed the strike as a weapon that unions used to appropriate
capital returns. Concern about unions and expropriation were suciently
prominent that it was the primary theme of the 1926, volume "New Tactics
in Social Conict", Harry W. Laidler and Norman Thomas, Editors), who
presented a symposium on industrial-labor relations, with the specic focus
on the conict between capital and labor: " We are concerned by the struggle
which inevitably rises, no matter how it may be concealed,...over prots
(that) legally belong not to the hired worker but to the owners....in practice,
labor in America has tended to ght out this struggle in terms of brute
conict. Nowhere in the world has the labor struggle in time of strikes been
more bitterly fought than here in America."
One reason rms feared unions is because of a high and growing union
wage premium. Table 1 shows union and non-union wages (Bureau of the
Census, 1976). Nominal union wages rise about 40 percent over this period,
while non-union wages rise about 6 percent.5 Microeconomic evidence is also
5There is about a 55 percent dierence between union and non-union wages this period.
Some of this dierence may be due to factors other than union market power, such as
human capital dierences in workers. However, I am focusing on the change in the premium
22consistent with a large union premium. For example, in May, 1922, the union
rate for wood patternmakers in Chicago was about 40 percent more than the
wage paid for the same occupation by International Harvester and Western
Electric, both non-union shops (Ozanne [16]).
The perceived threat of unionization raised wages of non-union works
during this period. Ozanne noted that International Harvester gave out
wage increases only "to buy o labor and prevent unionism", and did not
raise wages when unions were not perceived to be a threat. Firms that
feared unionization tended to pay higher wages. "Union wage inuence was
felt through wage concessions by employers who feared being unionized. This
magnied many times the inuence of the rapidly growing unions." (Ozanne
[16], page 52). Economist Frederick Mills argued that the threat of unions
kept non-union wages from being any lower in the 1920s than they were
(Bernstein [21]).
5.2. Preventing unionization in the Early 1920s
There was a substantial incentive to keep unions out of the workplace, and
rms were largely successful in preventing unionization in the early and mid
1920s. Union membership declined from about 17.4 percent in 1921 to about
10.5 percent by 1929 (Freeman [22]). Preventing unionization was fostered by
over the 1920s, and not the level of the premium.
23Court decisions and government policies that limited the ability of unions to
organize and that favored rms during strikes. Ebel and Ritschl [23] summa-
rize Court decisions and how they signicantly impeded union organization.
There is considerable discussion of the limited ability of unions to organize
in the 1920s among labor historians, which I summarize here (Bernstein [21]
is a standard reference). Prevention methods included company unions and
modest corporate welfare programs that are widely perceived to have kept
unions out of the workplace, and the use of violence when unions attempted
to organize or when workers called a strike. Gittelman [24], Ozanne [16],
and Jacoby [25] describe the use of company unions and welfare programs,
and Bernstein [21] describes rm violence during several union organization
attempts and strikes during the early and mid-1920s. These tactics included
kidnapping union organizers, ring workers who met with organizers, evicting
strikers from company-owned homes, denying medical care to striker families
from company-directed health providers, and beating and shooting strikers.
Firms were sometimes able to bribe local police, and also hired private police
forces that in some cases were deputized. Firm actions during strikes were
rarely prosecuted, but union actions were often prosecuted.
Large rms coordinated to prevent unionization. This included the Spe-
cial Commerce Committee, whose objective was "rst and foremost...to ex-
clude unions from their plants." (Gitelman [24]). Ozanne [16] describes the
24functions and activities of this Committee and using archival data also de-
scribes labor relations at International Harvester, which is considered to be
a representative member of the committee. Ozanne noted that "the major
objective for International Harvester was that of blocking outside unionism."
(page 156) The Committee coordinated corporate welfare programs and com-
pany unions to help suppress unionism, and there is agreement that these
programs were successful.6 Wages were a central topic of Special Conference
Committee meetings. In fact, at the Committee's meeting of March 20, 1931,
GM indicated that they were opposed to cutting wages, as was Bethlehem
6The origin of the Special Conference Committee is that the largest industrial com-
panies did not want their employment and wage policies to become public, because they
felt that these policies would lead to antitrust prosecution. Bethlehem Steel, Dupont,
GE, GM, Goodyear, International Harvester, Irving Bank and Trust, Exxon, US Rubber,
Westinghouse formed the Special Conference Committee, and AT&T and US Steel joined
afterwards. The Committee had no telephone listing, no letterhead, no bank account,
no dues. The Committee met regularly for roughly two decades to discuss and collude
on labor relations, wage policy, and national and legislative movements to regulate labor
relations. There was one full-time employee, who would report on union activities at each
meeting. Wage policies were very similar across companies. The rst public knowledge of
this committee arose during the 1937 hearings of Senator Robert LaFollette's Civil Liber-
ties Committee, which was investigating abuses of civil and personal rights by industry.
25Steel. Goodyear had maintained wages from 1929, but was considering a
wage cut. The major issue discussed at that meeting was how to deal with
union organizers following a wage cut.
5.3. A Sea Change in Labor Policies: Facilitating Unionization
Legislation and Court decisions on labor unions shifted substantially at
the end of the 1920s, and these changes signicantly aided union organization
and the impact of unions. These changes are described by Ebel and Ritschl
[23], and are briey summarized here. Key legislation included the Railway
Labor Act, which was strongly supported by Hoover, and which made col-
lective bargaining at the company level mandatory in that industry. The
act provided for state arbitration in labor disputes, and virtually eliminated
the ability of rms to impose company unions, which had been a key factor
in preventing independent unions during the 1920s. Even more important
was that this legislation was upheld by District Court in 1928, the Court
of Appeals in 1929, and the Supreme Court in 1930. These judicial reviews
overturned many previous court rulings that had upheld employer's rights
against unions.
There is considerable agreement that the Railway Act and subsequent
Court decisions were the genesis of legislation that facilitated unionization
and substantially increased labor bargaining power, including the Norris-
Laguardia Act of 1932, which prevented yellow dog contracts and which
26reduced the use of injunctions against labor, and the Wagner (National La-
bor Relations Act) of 1935, which in its original form not only provided
for collective bargaining, but also placed very few limitations on labor ac-
tions during strikes. In addition to legislation and Court decisions, and to
Hoover's support of unions, the deaths of strikers by militia in the mid-1920s
not surprisingly led governments to signicantly reconsider its policy during
strikes.
There is agreement that new union organization was ineective during the
1920s, that this was an important component of low unionization rates at that
time, and that ineective organization was largely the result of government
policies and Court decisions that favored rms. There is also agreement that
labor policies changed considerably in the late 1920s, that these changes
signicantly reduced rms' ability to prevent unionization and more broadly
raised the threat and cost of unionization. This analysis thus indicates that
there were benets to following Hoover's program that provided protection
from unions in return for paying moderately higher wages. The next section
develops an economic model to quantify the impact of Hoover's program
on the economy, and to assess the relative benets of following Hoover's
program.
276. The Hoover Economy
Hoover's plan provided rms with protection from unions if industry
maintained/raised their nominal wages and spread work by reducing the
average length of the workweek. To quantify the contribution of this policy
to the Depression, I construct a general equilibrium model tailored to capture
the main features of the Hoover program. Since the Hoover program did not
aect all sectors, I construct a two sector model in which one sector is sus-
ceptible to unionization and thus is aected by the Hoover program, and the
other sector is not susceptible to unionization and thus is not impacted by
the Hoover program. I will refer to these two sectors as manufacturing, and
agriculture, respectively, with the agricultural sector including agriculture
and other sectors in which potential unionization was less likely.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;:::1. There is a representative
household with many members, who supply labor and who consume a single
consumption good (C): Population grows at the constant rate n: Each of
these intermediate goods is a CES aggregate of output from an individual
industry within that sector. The output of industry i in sector s;s 2 fa;mg;




in which the length of the workweek is given by h; employment is given by e;
28and capital is given by k: I use a technology with a variable workweek since
Hoover's program impacted the workweek in manufacturing. This speci-
cation has been used by Kydland and Prescott [26], Braun and McGrattan
[27], Hayashi and Prescott [28], Osuna and Rios-Rull [29] , and McGrattan
and Ohanian [30], among others.7
7Capital input in this model is variable, and is equal to the capital stock scaled by the
length of the workweek, or hours per worker. In the model, utilization falls in manufac-
turing, which is consistent with actual manufacturing utilization during the Depression.
It is worth pointing out two issues about tieing the decline in utilization to hours per
worker. One is that some of the decline in utilization was due to plant closings, rather
than a shorter workweek across all plants. Another is that some worksharing was such that
workers were employed for fewer days, but the plant could have had the same workweek
length. I am unaware of data that can provide any type of detail on these distinctions,
however, so I will treat the model as a parsimonious tool for capturing low capital input
during the Depression, as it will allow the model to be consistent with actual manufac-
turing output per hour. This treatment is also reasonable because there is evidence that
worksharing that reduces the number of days an employee works, even keeping the length
of the workweek xed, also reduces output per hour (see Lanoie, Raymond, and Shearer
[31]).



















Y = C + X (3)
Labor is mobile across sectors, but capital is specic to each sector. The
evolution of the capital stocks for manufacturing and agriculture is given by:
Kst+1(i) = (1   )Kst(i) + Xst(i); (4)
Xst(i)  0 (5)
6.1. Household Problem
Each household member has one unit of time, and either works in the
agricultural sector, in the manufacturing sector, or engages in non-market
activities. Given a variable workweek in production, the household in the
benchmark model chooses the length of the workweek and the number who










Qt [wateat + wmtemt   ct] + 0 = 0; (6)
where Qt is the date t price of goods, ea is the number of household mem-
bers who work in the agricultural sector, em is the number who work in
the manufacturing sector, ha is the workweek length in agriculture, hm is
the workweek length in manufacturing, and 0 are date-zero prots. Note
that the opportunity cost of working includes not only hours worked for each
household member who works, but also includes a cost of sending household
members to work, which is governed by the function v(ea + em):To specify
this function, I assume that the cost of entering the workforce diers across
individuals in the family. Rank-ordering household members by their posi-
tion in the distribution of these costs, and specifying that these costs rise
linearly, I obtain:
 v(eat + emt) =  
Z et
i=0
(0 + 21x)dx =  (0et + 1e
2
t)
This specication yields a strictly convex cost function for employment,
and thus implies a well-dened problem for the household in choosing both
the number of workers and the length of the workweek.
316.2. Final Goods Production
Production of nal goods, which is the numeraire, is competitive. The
























s denotes the nal good producer's demand for the output from
industry i in sector s: This problem yields the following eciency condition







 1   ps(i) = 0 for all i and s = fa;mg: (8)
6.3. Intermediate Goods: The Competitive Sector
The agricultural sector is competitive. There is a single technology that
is used to produce intermediate goods for consumption and for investment
goods in this sector. The output price is pa: The maximization problem for















where rat+1(i) denotes the return to capital earned in the industry in period
t + 1: Note that ra is given by:





+ (1   ): (10)
326.4. Intermediate Goods: The Cartel Sector
Manufacturing industries also provide intermediate goods for production
of consumption and investment nal goods. The manufacturing sector is mo-
nopolistically competitive. The maximization problem for a representative













where rmt+1(i) denotes the return to capital earned in the industry in period
t + 1;and Q is the intertemporal price. Note that rm is given by:





+ (1   ) (12)
6.5. Parameterization
Several of the model parameters have values that are standard in the busi-
ness cycle literature. This includes the growth rate of technological progress,
which is two percent, the population growth rate, which is one percent, the
household discount factor (); which is chosen so that the steady state return
to capital is six percent, the exponent on capital in the production function,
which is 1/3, and the depreciation rate, which is ve percent annually.
I choose values for the utility function parameters ;0 and 1 to target
a steady state employment rate of 0.7, a steady state workweek length of
330.5, and that about 80 percent of the deviations in hours worked o of the
steady state growth path are due to changes in employment and about 20
percent are due to changes in the workweek length. This latter specication
is consistent with the relative contributions of changes in employment ver-
sus hours per worker to cyclical uctuations in total hours worked prior to
Hoover's program.8
In terms of the technology parameters,  governs the elasticity of substi-
tution within a sector, and is set at 0.9, which implies about a 10 percent
mark-up in a standard monopolistic competition version of the model. The
parameter  governs the substitution elasticity between goods across the
cartelized and non-cartelized sectors. I use a substitution elasticity of 1/2,
as in Cole and Ohanian [1]. This value is consistent with the facts that man-
ufacturing's relative price and its expenditure share have declined over time.
I specify the sectors of the economy under the Hoover program as manufac-
turing, mining, construction, transportation, and utilities, which accounted
for about 40 percent of employment in 1929, and this species the value for
the share parameter :
8The standard deviation of the log of manufacturing employment changes net of a linear
trend is about four times as large as the standard devation of the log of manufacturing
workweek changes net of a linear trend. The source of the data is Kendrick [5], page 465.
346.6. The Hoover Depression
This section presents the perfect foresight equilibrium path of the Hoover
economy. To do this, note that the Hoover intervention is a unanticipated
and permanent change in the model, with the economy transiting afterwards
to the Hoover steady state.
I construct the Hoover economy using the model above, and by introduc-
ing two additional features. First, I specify that the manufacturing sector
pays the observed real manufacturing wage sequence from 1929:4-1931:4. The
manufacturing wage is exogenous in the model, which I interpret as the prod-
uct of Hoover's xed nominal wage program in conjunction with deation.
The second feature is that the workweek in manufacturing is exogenously
xed at its actual sequence between 1929:4 - 1931:4. Hoover's worksharing
mandate is almost certainly the reason why the workweek declined so much
during the Depression.9 As discussed above, before Hoover's intervention,
the workweek length varied little over the cycle, as changes in employment,
rather than changes in hours per worker, accounted for most of the cyclical
change in manufacturing hours. For example, following the World War I
9Hoover intended his worksharing program to be a form of insurance against job loss.
However,recall that there was very little worksharing prior to Hoover's program. Presum-
ably, worksharing was always possible, and the fact that rms and workers did not choose
this option suggests that the benet exceeded its cost.
35demobilization, manufacturing hours declined considerably (falling about 25
percent between June, 1920 and December, 1921), but almost all of this was
due to lower employment, as hours per worker only fell about 3.5 percent
during this period. This cyclical stability of hours changed remarkably after
Hoover's intervention, with the workweek declining about 2/3 as much as
employment declined between late 1929 and late 1931.10.
Computing the equilibrium path requires a terminal condition. I choose
the terminal condition to be the steady state of the Hoover economy, with
the manufacturing wage permanently above its competitive level. The per-
manent impact of the policy is consistent with the fact that labor policies
changed permanently under Hoover, and is consistent with Hoover's goal of
permanently raising real wages, particularly for non-union workers. I there-
fore choose the terminal condition as the steady state of the economy with
the industrial wage permanently equal to its trend adjusted value in 1931:4,
which was about seven percent above its 1929:3 value.11 I treat the 1929:3
10The analysis could certainly be extended into 1932 and afterwards, as real industrial
wages remain above trend. I choose not to include later years, as it becomes clear during
1932 that Roosevelt will defeat Hoover. While Roosevelt expanded industrial and labor
cartelization policies beginning in 1933, as analyzed in Cole and Ohanian [1], including
this factor would complicate the analysis.
11I am unaware of evidence that rms or policymakers expected wages to return to
(trend-adjusted) 1929 levels. Note that choosing a value for the terminal wage of 7 percent
36value as the market-clearing wage prior to the policy. I also specify the work-
week length in manufacturing to be permanently set to its 1931:4 level for
the terminal economy.
I rst calculate the steady state of the Hoover economy. Table 2 shows
these steady state values relative to the pre-Hoover steady state. Hoover's
program generates a substantial steady state drop in economic activity, re-
ducing steady state output (Y), consumption (C), and investment (I) by
about 28 percent, and steady state total hours worked (H) by about 20 per-
cent. The decline in hours reects a 38 percent drop in steady state industrial
hours worked (Hm) and an eight percent drop in steady state agricultural
hours worked (Ha). The decline in agricultural hours reects a 30 percent
decline in the agricultural wage, which in turn reects a 20 percent decline
in the relative price of agricultural output. Thus, while workers can always
choose to work in the agricultural sector, the incentive to do so is reduced
substantially by the Hoover policy. This large change in the incentive to
work in the non-distorted sector operates through general equilibrium eects
created by the Hoover program.
To calculate the equilibrium transition path of the economy to the Hoover
steady state, I set the initial capital stocks at their pre-Hoover steady state
above trend is a very conservative choice relative to the actual value of the manufacturing
wage that prevailed after 1931.
37values. Figures 4 - 8 show the transition path of real output, consumption,
investment, and hours worked in the model, compared to the actual values of
those variables between 1929:4 and 1931:4.12 The Hoover program depresses
the economy substantially, reducing aggregate hours by about 20 percent by
the end of 1931, and reducing real GDP by about 18 percent. The model also
generates a depression that is considerably worse in the manufacturing sec-
tor, as manufacturing hours decline 33 percent by 1931:4, while agricultural
hours fall by about 11 percent. Consumption is 12 percent lower in 1931:4,
while investment is 55 percent lower at this date. Note that investment rises
temporarily when the policy is adopted, which is due to two simplifying fea-
tures in the model. One is the perfect foresight assumption, and the other is
that there are no investment adjustment costs. While both of these features
create a very transient incentive to accumulate additional capital, invest-
ment in the model is below trend in late 1930, and falls quickly thereafter.
Including either time-to-build in the production of capital goods, or convex
adjustment costs would substantially dampen the transitory investment in-
crease. The workweek restriction is important as it allows the model to be
consistent with the fact that actual manufacturing output per hour does not
rise substantially. In particular, manufacturing output per hour is on aver-
12With the exception of manufacturing hours, the actual data are linearly interpolated
to the quarterly frequence.
38age slightly higher during this period, and in the model is about 2 percent
higher.
To shed further light on the permanent impact of the policy on the econ-
omy, I compare these ndings to those of Cole and Ohanian [32], Table 9,
who studied the impact of the same real manufacturing wage sequence in a
similar economy, but assuming that the wage distortion was transitory, rather
than permanent, and with no workweek restriction. Amaral and MacGee [33]
also use a two-sector model with inexible manufacturing wages and exible
agricultural wages to analyze the Depression as the result of a transitory
monetary shock. The impact of the high real manufacturing wage in both of
these analyses is much smaller than here, with real output falling only about
4 percent by 1931. This reects the fact that steady state hours and capital
are not depressed in these other analyses.13 This suggests that quantifying
a depression of this magnitude in this class of models requires a permanent,
not a transitory, distortion.
13Bordo et al [34] generate a much larger depression from high wages, though their
analysis is in an economy in which all wages in all sectors are high, and the real wage
sequence they use is higher than the one used here.
397. Introducing a Union in the Model
This analysis assumes that rms followed Hoover's program because the
alternative of not following Hoover, but having to deal with the possibility
of union organization, was less protable. To assess this hypothesis, I extend
the model economy to include the possibility of union organization, which
I model in an insider-outsider framework. The union model is tailored to
capture a key feature of unions in the 1920s and 1930s, which is the ability
to strike and hold-up capital. It thus diers from Cole and Ohanian [1], in
which the insiders make an oer before capital is in place. In this model, the
insider's oer is made after capital is installed, thus creating the hold-up.
A summary of the union model is as follows. Firms rst choose investment
to augment their existing capital stock. If the rm does not follow the Hoover
plan, then with probability  the industry is organized as a union by the
current workers, whom I call insiders. With probability 1   , organization
does not occur, and the rms can hire labor from the spot labor market at
the competitive wage w; and behave as a monopolistic competitor.
If organized, the insiders make a take it or leave it oer consisting of
a wage-employment pair, ( w;  e). If the oer is rejected, the insiders strike.
The strike shuts down the rm (industry) for one period with probability !;
and the rm suers a capital loss of depreciated capital. With probability
1 !; the rm breaks the strike, and operates, paying the spot market wage
40w: Agreements are negotiated each period after investment takes place. In
equilibrium, the union's oer is such that the rm weakly prefers to accept.
7.0.1. The Negotiation Game
The bargaining model is a two-stage negotiation game, and is symmetric
across industries. If rms do not follow Hoover, then with probability  the
workers organize, and are organized thereafter. If the workers organize, then
with probability ! the rm is shut down for 1 period with a strike if the rm
rejects the worker's oer. With probability 1 !; the strike fails to shut the
rm down, and in this case the industry hires labor at the spot wage w. In
stage one the workers make a wage and employment proposal for the current
period: ( wt;  et): Firms either accept or reject the workers' proposal. If the
rms accept, they hire  et units of labor at the wage  wt: The industry also
colludes on investment.14
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is constructed as
the limit of the bargaining game played a nite number of periods within
an individual industry. In this case, the rm's strategy in equilibrium is to
accept any wage and employment oer (  w;  et) that yields a reservation level
14Firms and workers bargain over the number of employees and the wage, but not hours
per worker. This makes the contract much simpler, and is also consistent with the adoption
of the 40 hour workweek through the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1939.
41of prots.
7.0.2. Cartel Problem
I rst dene the prot function as a function of the wage rate for the
monopolist in one of the cartelized sectors. To keep the notation simple, I
drop the industry (i) subscript for the time being. The monopolist's prot
function, conditional on capital stock k; is (k);and the associated optimal











1    we + (1   )k
o
; (13)
where e(k) = e; and Ym is manufacturing output used in nal goods produc-
tion.15
I now use this prot function to construct the industry's reservation prot
function, which is the outside option to the industry of rejecting the union's
oer. To do this, note that there are two payos to industry collusion, a
static payo, which is the payo from exploiting market power in the current
product market, and a dynamic payo, which is the payo from the industry
colluding on investment. The static payo is (w;k1): The returns that the
15The functions for t and Nt also depend upon Y; Ym and rt, but that is captured by
the time dependence of the functions.































Thus, the total payo is the sum of date t monopoly prots and invest-
ment collusion, (k1) + P2(k0); where k1 is the current level of the capital
stock. This implies that the total expected gross return to the rm from
rejecting the union oer is:
P1(k1) = (1   !)(k1) + P2(k
0) + !(1   )k1   k
0;
The rst term on the right hand side is the prot from paying the spot market
wage, scaled by the probability that a strike does not shut down production.
The second term is the payo from colluding on investment, and the third
term is the payo from shutdown, scaled by the probability of shutdown.
P1(k1) thus denes the reservation prots that the rm must earn from any
union oer. In equilibrium the workers will oer a wage-employment pair that
yields a return that is equal to this reservation level: (k1;  w1;  e1) = P1(k1)
Recursively, this is given by:
P(k) = (1   !)(k)   k
0 + P(k
0) + !(1   )k;
43where k0 denotes the level of the capital stock that the rms in the industry
will choose. This will be the capital stock along the equilibrium path since
the workers will always oer ( w;  e) such that the rms earn their reservation
prot level, and thus weakly prefer accepting the oer (see Cole and Ohanian
[35]).
7.1. The Insiders' Problem
The insiders oer a wage/employment pair at each date that maximizes
the present discounted value of rents per worker from the cartelized sector,
subject to the reservation prot constraint.16 This value depends on the
existing stock of workers in the industry at the beginning of the period and
the capital stock. We denote the existing number of workers in the industry
at the beginning of the period by e; which is equal to the number of workers at
the end of the previous period multiplied by the probability that the workers
remain in that industry:
16I assume families are large enough to smooth out a family member's employment
risk, but are small enough to work in only an arbitrarily small fraction of the industries.
These assumptions imply that the family is risk neutral with respect to the employment
outcome of any individual family member. Moreover, this implies that the family does
not internalize the aggregate consequences of their actions since the likelihood of a family
member obtaining a cartel job is independent of the actions of the industries in which
family members work.
44et = et 1
We denote the number of those who work in the cartel that period by  e: If
 e < e; then e  e of the workers are randomly chosen to leave the industry. If
 e > e; then the union adds members using a lottery. Given P; the solution to
the cartel workers' problem is implicitly determined by the following Bellman
equation in which V (e;k) denotes the expected value of being a cartel worker
(relative to working in the competitive sector), in which there are e workers
in the industry at the beginning of the period, and k units of capital in place:
V (e;k) = max













subject to (k;  w;  e)   k
0 + P(k
0)  P(k):
The left hand side of the constraint is the rm's payo if it accepts the workers
oer, where (k;  w;  e) denotes the prots that it earns during the period, and
 k0+P(k0) is the return from colluding on investment. The right hand side
is the rm's expected payo if it rejects the insiders' oer. As in Cole and
Ohanian (2004), it can be shown that there exists an optimal size for the
insiders, e and an associated maximum wage, w; which maximizes insider
wages subject to the reservation prot constraint. It can also be shown that
if the initial number of insiders exceeds the optimal size, then the number of
45insiders declines monotonically at rate 1    on the transition path to the
steady state:Cole and Ohanian [35] present details of this model.
7.2. The Steady State of the Union Model
To demonstrate the impact of the insider-outsider distortion, I present
the steady state of the union model relative to the model without the union.
Parameter values are the same as chosen above, and there are two additional
parameters, the probability that a strike is successful (!); and a union mem-
ber's survival probability ()17 I choose ! such that the union wage is 25
percent above trend, which is a conservative choice relative to estimates of
union wages relative to trend at that time. The implied value of ! is about
0.8. I am unaware of any specic estimates of the likelihood that a strike
would disrupt production. Dinardo and Hallock [36] analyzed major strikes
between 1925 and 1937 and classied whether the strike was "won" by work-
ers, "won" by rms, or whether the result of the strike was a compromise
between the union and rm. They estimated that 50 percent or more of
strikes were either won by workers or there was a compromise. While the
implied value of ! in the model is higher than the union's "win/compromise"
rate estimated by Dinardo and Hallock, note that strikes that weren't nec-
17I keep the same workweek length in manufacturing in the union analysis as in the
Hoover analysis.
46essarily considered to be won by labor will still impede production and lead
to losses for rms.
I choose a value for the probability of remaining an insider () to yield
an expected job tenure of about 10 years. Job tenure data from this period
is limited, but the model expected job tenure is high compared to the fact
that about half of manufacturing jobs in the 1920s lasted 1 year or less (see
Jacoby and Sharma [37], and that mean completed duration of jobs at Ford
Motor company plants during the 1919-1947 period were less than half a year
(see Whatley and Sedo [38]). Note, however, that this parameter does not
aect the steady state.
Table 3 shows the steady state values of the union model variables rela-
tive to those in the pre-Hoover steady state. Unionization generates a larger
depression than the Hoover program, with output, consumption and invest-
ment declining by nearly 40 percent. and aggregate hours declining by nearly
30 percent, representing a 54 percent decline in manufacturing hours, and an
11 percent decline in agriculture hours.
With the hold-up version of the model in place, I now assess the incen-
tive for rms to follow the Hoover plan. To do this, I compare the expected
present value of prots under the Hoover plan, beginning in 1929:4 and con-
tinuing through the terminal economy, to prots if rms don't follow Hoover,
but instead operate in the economy with the risk of unionization.
47Prots in the model with the threat of unionization depends on the prob-
ability of unionization, : I therefore solve for the value for  such that rms
are indierent between following Hoover or deviating and risking unioniza-
tion.
This involves a tradeo in that expected prots in the Hoover economy
are lower initially, but higher later compared to the economy with the risk of
unionization. I nd that rms choose to follow Hoover's program provided
that ; the probability of the rm's workers organizing, is 10 percent per
year or higher. Thus, it is reasonable that rms would be willing to raise
real wages about 7 percent per year in order to avoid the signicantly higher
wages that a union would ultimately extract.
8. A Monetary Theory for the Depression
This section discusses the ndings within the broader context of the Great
Depression literature. The traditional explanation is that monetary con-
traction, which created deation and low nominal spending, is the cause of
the Great Depression. This conclusion has been reached by a number of
economists, including, Friedman and Schwartz [2], Lucas and Rapping [39],
Hamilton [40], Eichengreen [41], Bernanke [42], Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
[34], among many others. But any monetary explanation of the Depression
requires a theory of a very large and very protracted monetary nonneutral-
48ity. Such a theory has been elusive because the Depression is so much larger
than any other downturn, and because explaining the persistence of such a
large nonneutrality requires in turn a theory for why the normal economic
forces that ultimately undo monetary nonneutrality were grossly absent in
this episode. That is, if the Depression is largely the result of monetary
forces, then the size and the duration of the monetary nonneutrality were
remarkably well outside estimates from any other period.
This paper provides such a theory for a large and protracted monetary
nonneutrality. The nonneutrality is quantitatively large in the Hoover econ-
omy because Hoover's wage maintenance and work-sharing program reduces
steady state hours and capital stocks. The nonneutrality persists in this
model because it is a transition from a non-distorted steady state to the
Hoover distorted steady state.
There was little nominal wage adjustment in the rst two years of the
Depression, as industry publicly maintained nominal wage levels following the
Hoover meeting, and indicated that their adherence to wage maintenance was
indeed due to Hoover. Industry followed Hoover, despite Hoover's rejection
of several industry requests to Hoover to cut wages. And in addition to the
evidence presented here, Rose [43] compiles complementary evidence from
U.S. Chamber of Commerce archives that supports the thesis that Hoover's
program was a key factor in accounting for industry's maintenance of nominal
49wages. This analysis thus provides a theoretical interpretation for Hamilton's
[40] view that deation is the central initiating force for the Great Depression.
While Hoover's nominal wage maintenance program has been previously
noted in the literature, including work by Rothbard [44] O'Brien [18], Vedder
and Gallway [45], Bordo, Erceg, and Evans [34], and Cole and Ohanian [32], I
am unaware of other research that has provided a detailed accounting of how
the program aected industry, oer a theory for why rms followed Hoover,
and conduct a quantitative analysis of the Hoover plan within a growth
model. The most closely related work is a contemporaneous analysis by Ebel
and Ritschl [23] who present an analysis that is thematically very similar,
with a focus on policy changes that fostered organization and bargaining
power a the end of the 1920s. They discuss in detail the Court decisions
aecting unionization during this period, develop a wage bargaining model,
and interpret the Depression as a shift from individual bargaining to collective
(union) bargaining. Reicher [46] also develops a search and matching model
to analyze the 1930s with a focus on understanding both the contributions
of deation and changes in labor bargaining power.
This paper also presents a response to Mulligan's [6] arguement against
unionization as a source of the the Depression's labor market distortion, one
reason being that union density is low during the Hoover years. In this paper,
the distortion is not unionization density per se, but rather a broader change
50in labor market policies, including Hoover's program that oered protection
against possible unionization.
I am also unaware of other theories of nominal wage maintenance that
are consistent with the evidence presented here about Hoover and industry's
maintenance of nominal wages. O'Brien [18] is perhaps the best known anal-
ysis of nominal wage rigidity during the Depression. He argues that industry
maintained nominal wage levels, despite their impact on prots, simply be-
cause rms viewed this action as being in their self interest for boundedly
rational reasons. But O'Brien's view is inconsistent with these data, which
indicate that rms did not prefer to maintain high nominal wages, but rather
did this only because of Hoover's program. Moreover, as Rose [43] notes,
O'Brien's' theory is subject to a large free-rider problem, as any individual
rm would have a big incentive to cut wages.
9. Conclusion
The dening characteristic of the Great Depression is a substantial and
chronic excess supply of labor, with employment well below normal, and real
wages in key industrial sectors well above normal. A successful theory of the
Depression must explain not only why the labor market failed to clear, but
why monetary forces apparently had such large and protracted eects. This
paper proposes such a theory, based on President Hoover's program that of-
51fered industrial rms protection from unions in return for paying high wages.
Firms deeply feared unions at this time, reecting a growing union wage pre-
mium and a sea change in economic policy, including policies advanced and
supported by Hoover, that signicantly fostered unionization and enhanced
their bargaining power. Consequently, there was an incentive for rms to fol-
low Hoover's program of paying moderately higher real wages to avoid even
higher wages and lower prots that would come from unionization.
I conclude that the Depression is the consequence of government programs
and policies, including those of Hoover, that increased labor's ability to raise
wages above their competitive levels. The Depression would have been much
less severe in the absence of Hoover's program. Similarly, given Hoover's
program, the Depression would have been much less severe if monetary policy
had responded to keep the price level from falling, which raised real wages.
This analysis also provides a theory for why low nominal spending - what
some economists refer to as decient aggregate demand - generated such a
large depression in the 1930s, but not in the early 1920s, which was a period of
comparable deation and monetary contraction, but when rms cut nominal
wages considerably.18
18Kendrick's data shows that real output fell only around 3 percent in the early 1920s,
but real consumption and investment actually increased. Thus, the 1921-22 recession
largely reects a decline in government purchases, which partially reects the postwar
52Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt shared similar goals of fostering indus-
trial collusion and increasing real wages and raising labor's bargaining power.
Hoover accomplished these goals during a period of deation by inducing in-
dustry to maintain nominal wages, and by promoting and signing legislation
that facilitated union organization and that increased wages above compet-
itive levels, including the Davis-Bacon Act and the Norris-Lagaurdia Act.
Roosevelt accomplished these goals with the NIRA and the Wagner Act,
both of which raised wages well above competitive levels while increasing
industrial collusion.
The 1930s would have been a better economic decade had government pol-
icy promoted competition in product and labor markets, rather than adopt-
















Steady State of the Hoover Economy
Relative to Pre-Hoover Steady State
(Pre-Hoover Variables = 100)
Y C I H Wm Hm Wa Ha
72 72 71 80 107 61 68 92
Table 3
Steady State of the Union Model
54Relative to Pre-Hoover Steady State
(Pre-Hoover Variables = 100)
Y C I H Wm Hm Wa Ha
62 62 61 73 125 48 56 89
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